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TO SOLVE IT ARIGHT: RERUM NOVARUM AND NEW 
JERSEY’S ANSWER TO CATHOLIC BISHOP OF 
CHICAGO 
Daniel T. Paxton* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Pope Leo XIII’s landmark Rerum Novarum: Encyclical of 
Pope Leo XIII on Capital and Labor (“Rerum Novarum”) for the 
first time in the history of the Catholic Church explicitly 
conveyed support for organized labor.1 In Rerum Novarum, the 
pope identified the income inequality of the period, and decried 
the deplorable circumstances endured by most of the world’s 
working class people.2 The pope described what he considered 
 
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Menelaos W. Toskos, J.S.C., Superior Court of New 
Jersey, Chancery Division, General Equity Part. J.D., Seton Hall University School of 
Law; B.A. Rutgers College. I would like to thank Professor Angela Carmella for her 
teaching, and my father for his example. 
 1 Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter, Rerum Novarum: Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII 
on Capital and Labor 49 (1892) [hereinafter Rerum Novarum] (“[T]he most important 
of all [aid organizations] are workingmen’s unions . . . . It is gratifying to know that 
there are actually in existence not a few associations of this nature, consisting either of 
workmen alone, or of workmen and employers together, but it were greatly to be 
desired that they should become more numerous and more efficient.”). The Catholic 
Church acknowledges the innovation of Rerum Novarum while noting its connection to 
its doctrinal forebears: 
The Church’s concern for social matters certainly did not begin with that 
document, for the Church has never failed to show interest in society. Nonetheless, 
the Encyclical Letter Rerum Novarum marks the beginning of a new path. 
Grafting itself onto a tradition hundreds of years old, it signals a new beginning 
and a singular development of the Church’s teaching in the area of social matters. 
In her continuous attention to men and women living in society, the Church has 
accumulated a rich doctrinal heritage. This has its roots in Sacred Scripture, 
especially the Gospels and the apostolic writings, and takes on shape and body 
beginning from the Fathers of the Church and the great Doctors of the Middle 
Ages, constituting a doctrine which, even without explicit and direct Magisterial 
pronouncements, the Church gradually came to recognize her competence. 
PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE 
OF THE CHURCH 39 (2004) [hereinafter PONTIFICAL COUNCIL] (emphasis in original). 
 2 Rerum Novarum supra note 1, at 1 (noting “the enormous fortunes of some 
few individuals, and the utter poverty of the masses”); id. at 47 (“For, the result of civil 
change and revolution has been to divide cities into two classes separated by a wide 
chasm. On the one side there is the party which holds power because it holds wealth; 
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the unacceptable situations that befell these people: endless 
hours that sapped health and inhibited religious observance, 
rock-bottom wages resulting from coercion, dangerous and 
sometimes life-threatening working conditions, and no 
collective voice to seek change and redress.3 In cases where 
these ills existed, the pope made clear that the aid and the 
authority of the state should be invoked on behalf of wage-
earners.4 
Rerum Novarum praised Catholics who supported labor 
unions and their focus on the improvement of working 
conditions, wages, and collective action.5 While calling on the 
 
which has in its grasp the whole of labor and trade; which manipulates for its own 
benefit and its own purposes all the sources of supply, and which is not without 
influence even in the administration of the commonwealth. On the other side there is 
the needy and powerless multitude, sick and sore in spirit and ever ready for 
disturbance.”); id. at 2 (“[S]ome opportune remedy must be found quickly for the misery 
and wretchedness pressing so unjustly on the majority of the working class.”). Msgr. 
William Murphy explains that Pope Leo XIII acted on behalf of people’s economic 
welfare long before he wrote Rerum Novarum. William Murphy, Rerum Novarum, in A 
CENTURY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: ESSAYS ON ‘RERUM NOVARUM’ AND NINE 
OTHER KEY DOCUMENTS 1, 5 (George Weigel & Robert Royal eds., 1991). In his time as 
Bishop of Perugia, Pope Leo XIII (then Bishop Pecci) “took an active interest in the 
social and economic conditions of the people of his diocese and helped organize 
cooperatives that offered people not only the money they needed for agricultural 
development but also food in times of scarcity.” Id. 
 3 Rerum Novarum supra note 1, at 42 (“[T]he first thing of all to secure is to 
save unfortunate working people from the cruelty of men of greed, who use human 
beings as mere instruments for money-making. It is neither just nor human so to grind 
men down with excessive labor as to stupefy their minds and wear out their bodies.”); 
id. at 40–41 (“The working man, too, has interests in which he should be protected by 
the State . . . . From this follows the obligation of the cessation from work and labor on 
Sundays and certain holy days.”); id. at 45 (“[N]evertheless, there underlies a dictate of 
natural justice more imperious and ancient than any bargain between man and man, 
namely, that wages ought not to be insufficient to support a frugal and well-behaved 
wage-earner. If through necessity or fear of a worse evil the workman accept harder 
conditions because an employer or contractor will afford him no better, he is made the 
victim of force and injustice.”). 
 4 Id. at 36, 37 (“The richer class have many ways of shielding themselves, and 
stand less in need of help from the State; whereas the mass of the poor have no 
resources of their own to fall back upon, and must chiefly depend upon the assistance 
of the State. And it is for this reason that wage-earners, since they mostly belong in the 
mass of the needy, should be specially cared for and protected by the government.”). 
 5 Id. at 55 (“Those Catholics are worthy of all praise—and they are not a few—
who, understanding what the times require, have striven, by various undertakings and 
endeavors, to better the condition of the working class by rightful means. They have 
taken up the cause of the working man, and have spared no efforts to better the 
condition both of families and individuals; to infuse a spirit of equity into the mutual 
relations of employers and employed . . . . It is with such ends in view that we see men 
of eminence, meeting together for discussion, for the promotion of concerted action, and 
for practical work. Others, again, strive to unite working men of various grades into 
associations, help them with their advice and means, and enable them to obtain fitting 
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faithful to eschew oppressive policies in their own businesses, 
Pope Leo XIII also noted the integral role labor unions played 
in righting these wrongs.6 The encyclical called on all people to 
work towards the goals championed by the unions.7 With 
Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo XIII launched a tradition in the 
Catholic Church of recognizing the centrality of these 
organizations in defending working people.8 
Despite the clarity of Pope Leo XIII’s message and the 
doctrine it initiated, Catholic schools and universities in the 
 
and profitable employment . . . . We find therein grounds for most cheering hope in the 
future, provided always that the associations We have described continue to grow and 
spread, and are well and wisely administered.”). 
 6 Id. at 20 (“The following duties bind the wealthy owner and the employer: not 
to look upon their work people as their bondsmen, but to respect in every man his 
dignity as a person ennobled by Christian character. They are reminded that, 
according to natural reason and Christian philosophy, working for gain is creditable . . . 
but to misuse men as though they were things in the pursuit of gain, or to value them 
solely for their physical powers—that is truly shameful and inhuman.”); id. at 60 (“At 
the time being, the condition of the working classes is the pressing question of the 
hour, and nothing can be of higher interest to all classes of the State than that it 
should be rightly and reasonably settled. But it will be easy for Christian working men 
to solve it aright if they will form associations, choose wise guides, and follow on the 
path which with so much advantage to themselves and the common weal was trodden 
by their fathers before them.”). 
 7 Rerum Novarum supra note 1, at 61. (“Every one should put his hand to the 
work which falls to his share, and that at once and straightway, lest the evil which is 
already so great become through delay absolutely beyond remedy.”). 
 8 See Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Quadragesimo Anno 140 (1931) (“No less 
praise must be accorded the leaders of workers’ organizations who, disregarding their 
own personal advantage and concerned solely about the good of their fellow members, 
are striving prudently to harmonize the just demands of their members with the 
prosperity of their whole occupation and also to promote these demands, and who do 
not let themselves be deterred from so noble a service by any obstacle or suspicion.”); 
Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Laborem Exercens 20 (1981) [hereinafter Laborem 
Exercens] (“All these rights . . . give rise to yet another right: the right of association, 
that is to form associations for the purpose of defending the vital interests of those 
employed in the various professions. These associations are called labour or trade 
unions. . . . Catholic social teaching does not hold that unions are no more than a 
reflection of the “class” structure of society and that they are a mouthpiece for class 
struggle which inevitably governs social life. They are indeed a mouthpiece for the 
struggle for social justice, for the just rights of working people in accordance with their 
individual professions.”) (emphasis in original); PONTIFICAL COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 
301–07 (“The Magisterium recognizes the fundamental role played by labor unions, 
whose existence is connected with the right to form associations or unions to defend the 
vital interests of workers employed in the various professions.”) (emphasis in original); 
Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter, Caritas in Veritate 25 (2009) (“The repeated calls 
issued within the Church’s social doctrine, beginning with Rerum Novarum, for the 
promotion of workers’ associations that can defend their rights must therefore be 
honoured today even more than in the past, as a prompt and far-sighted response to 
the urgent need for new forms of cooperation at the international level, as well as the 
local level.”). 
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United States have mostly rejected its call in their own labor 
relations.9 The extent to which this rejection has occurred is 
shocking. At the primary and secondary level, approximately 
1.9 million children attend 6,568 Catholic schools.10 If the 
percentage of organized Catholic school teachers tracks the 
national percentage of organized private labor, only six percent 
of the teachers at those schools have unions.11 In higher 
education, the conflict between church doctrine and church 
practice is even greater. The Council of Catholic Bishops lists 
over two hundred degree-granting institutions affiliated with 
the Catholic Church.12 Only a small number of these schools 
recognize unions representing their employees.13 
 
 9 UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Pastoral Letter, Economic Justice for All: 
Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy 353 (1986) (“All 
church institutions must also fully recognize the rights of employees to organize and 
bargain collectively with the institution through whatever association or organization 
they freely choose.”); Beth Griffin, Adjunct faculty want to form union at Catholic 
university, two colleges, CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE (Aug. 12, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.catholicnews.com/services/englishnews/2013/adjunct-faculty-want-to-form-
union-at-catholic-university-two-colleges.cfm (“As adjunct faculty members have 
become a larger percentage of the academic staff at colleges and universities, many 
have sought to unionize. Their efforts have been more successful at nonreligious 
private institutions than at Catholic ones.”); Michael Sean Winters, Catholic 
Universities & Unions, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER (Dec. 15, 2015), 
https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/distinctly-catholic/catholic-universities-unions 
(“Several Catholic universities are engaged in labor disputes, trying to deny their 
adjunct professors, or other employees, the right to organize a union.”); Nicholas G. 
Hahn III, Unions Take On Catholic Schools, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 10, 
2016, 6:45 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/unions-take-on-catholic-schools-
1457653526 (“Religious institutions of higher education have long opposed attempts by 
the National Labor Relations Board to assert authority over their faculty and staff.”). 
See also John Gehring, Pope Francis, the labor movement’s best friend?, CNN (Sept. 6, 
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/06/opinions/gehring-pope-francis-labor/ (“In 2011, 
when a coalition of more than 200 faith leaders in Ohio united to oppose a law that 
significantly weakened collective bargaining for public workers, the state’s Catholic 
bishops took a neutral position and stayed quiet.”). 
 10 Dale McDonald and Margaret M. Schultz, Synopsis: United States Catholic 
Elementary and Secondary Schools 2014-2015, NAT’L CATHOLIC EDUC. ASSOC., 
https://www.ncea.org/data-information/catholic-school-data (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
 11 Economic News Release: Union Members Summary, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (“Public-
sector workers had a union membership rate (35.7 percent) more than five times higher 
than that of private-sector workers (6.6 percent).”). However, the same report states, 
“Workers in education, training, and library occupations and in protective service 
occupations had the highest unionization rate, at 35.3 percent for each occupation 
group.” Id. 
 12 UNITED STATES COUNCIL OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Catholic Colleges and 
Universities in the United States, http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/how-we-
teach/catholic-education/higher-education/catholic-colleges-and-universities-in-the-
united-states.cfm. 
 13 Daniel Petri, Catholic Universities Should Be Pro-Union, MILLENIAL (Apr. 7, 
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The few workers who have managed to gain the labor rights 
that Pope Leo XIII and more than one hundred years of 
Catholic doctrine proclaimed they deserved had to fight for 
them.14 Catholic schools have opposed unionization at almost 
every turn.15 Their efforts to do so have been bolstered by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of 
Chicago (“Catholic Bishop”).16  
In that case, the Court avoided addressing the claims of 
teachers at Catholic schools seeking to organize by interpreting 
federal law to deny the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB” or “the Board”) jurisdiction over the dispute.17 To 
buttress its creation of a novel employer exclusion to the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”), the Court 
noted that this decision allowed it to sidestep a constitutional 
ruling regarding the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment.18 Subsequent conflicting decisions by the NLRB 
 
2015), http://millennialjournal.com/2015/04/07/catholic-universities-should-be-pro-
union/ (“What’s even more alarming, however, is the mere 23% of college/university 
level educators who are represented by unions.”). 
 14 See e.g. Winters, supra note 9; Anne Hendershott, NLRB Makes Inroads at 
Catholic Colleges, CATHOLIC WORLD REPORT (Feb. 12, 2015), 
http://www.catholicworldreport.com/Item/3690/nlrb_makes_inroads_at_catholic_college
s.aspx (“Adjunct faculty members at [Manhattan College in Riverdale, St. Xavier 
University in Chicago, and Seattle University] had been denied the ability to unionize 
because the schools are ‘religious institutions.’ School leaders had attempted to block 
unionization, claiming such efforts posed a threat to their schools’ religious 
character.”); Tom Suhrbur, Not In My Backyard: St. Xavier University Fights Union 
Organizing, NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (Nov. 15, 2011), 
http://www.nea.org/home/47699.htm (discussing St. Xavier University’s opposition to 
unionization of its adjunct faculty even though the university has never objected to its 
full-time faculty union, and suggesting the reason for the difference is the national 
affiliation of the proposed adjunct union). But see Griffin, supra note 9 (“Adjunct 
faculty at Georgetown University in Washington won union representation quickly and 
without resistance from the administration . . . .”). 
 15 See Winters, supra note 9; Hendershott, supra note 14; Local NLRB: 
Manhattan Adjuncts May Tally Union Vote, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 27, 2015), https:// 
www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2015/08/27/local-nlrb-manhattan-adjuncts-may-
tally-union-vote (“A regional National Labor Relations Board office said Wednesday 
that adjuncts at Manhattan College may count their union election votes. The ballots 
have been impounded since 2011, when the Roman Catholic college objected to NLRB 
jurisdiction over its campus, citing its religious affiliation.”). 
 16 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979). 
 17 Id. 
 18 National Labor Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (“The term 
‘employer’ includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, 
but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, 
or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any 
person subject to the Railway Labor Act . . . or any labor organization (other than when 
acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor 
Paxton.219-248.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/31/17 5:06 PM 
224 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2017 
and lower courts regarding jurisdiction over teachers and the 
religious schools at which they work have made the organizing 
ability of teachers at Catholic schools ambiguous.19  
This Article will argue that the Board’s newly announced 
Pacific Lutheran test, while an improvement over the D.C. 
Circuit’s gossamer Great Falls test, will ultimately be rejected 
by the Supreme Court, despite its similarity to the ministerial 
exception the Court recognized in Hosanna-Tabor.20 To remedy 
this problem and to ensure the NLRA provides robust 
protection for employees of religious schools, the Board should 
adopt the New Jersey Supreme Court’s St. Teresa test: when 
secular contract terms are in controversy, state jurisdiction is 
appropriate because it does not offend the Religion Clauses of 
 
organization.”); Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. at 497; U.S. CONST. amend. I 
(“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof. . . .”). 
 19 See generally Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 383 (1st 
Cir. 1985) (denying the Board’s asserted jurisdiction since the school held itself out as a 
Catholic institution, faculty could be punished for behavior violating religious rules, 
and the administration of the school was dominated by the founding religious order); 
Jewish Day School, 283 NLRB 757 (1987) (finding a lack of jurisdiction due to the 
prevalence of Judaic studies and practice in the school); Livingstone College, 286 
NLRB 1308 (1987) (finding jurisdiction where the teachers were not required to 
support the church, the school’s main goals were secular, and the church was absent 
from daily administrative activities); University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 
1347 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (denying the Board’s asserted jurisdiction and establishing a 
three-prong test to determine jurisdiction over religious schools that asks whether (1) 
the school holds itself out to the community, faculty, and students as a religious 
institution, (2) the school is organized as a nonprofit, and (3) the school is controlled, 
owned, operated by, or affiliated with, directly or indirectly, a recognized religious 
organization or an entity that determines membership partly by reference to religion); 
Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB 157 (2014) (finding jurisdiction and creating a 
new test combining the Great Falls test with an element of the Supreme Court’s newly 
recognized ministerial exception). 
 20 Pacific Lutheran, 361 NLRB at 161. The Board set the following requirements 
for a religious school to escape its jurisdiction over labor disputes: (1) the school must 
hold itself out “as providing a religious educational environment,” and (2) the school 
must hold out the petitioning faculty as “performing a specific role in creating or 
maintaining the school’s religious educational environment.”; Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 
1347; Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 
171 (2012) (“We agree [with the Courts of Appeals] that there is such a ministerial 
exception. The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their 
ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a 
church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. . . . 
By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which 
protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its 
appointments. According the state the power to determine which individuals will 
minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits 
government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”). 
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the First Amendment.21 The Board should clarify that this 
jurisdiction includes the NLRA’s traditional protections for 
recognition rights, bargaining rights, and grievance 
procedures.22  
Part II of this Article will discuss the seminal cases and the 
various tests they have applied bearing on the issue of union 
organization at religious schools. Part III will show that the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s reasoning in St. Teresa, 
implementing the New Jersey State Constitution’s right to 
organize, protects workers’ rights while avoiding the 
shortcomings and pitfalls associated with Great Falls and 
Pacific Lutheran. Part IV will argue that Catholic schools in 
particular should welcome strong labor protections for 
employees because those protections are consonant with more 
than a century of Catholic social doctrine regarding labor.23  
II. CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND LABOR: FROM CATHOLIC 
BISHOP TO PACIFIC LUTHERAN 
A. Catholic Bishop and the Constitutional Floor 
In 1979, a closely divided Supreme Court decided NLRB v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, holding that Congress failed to 
clearly express an affirmative intention to protect teachers in 
 
 21 South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus 
Church Elem. Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 718 (N.J. 1997) (“By limiting the scope of collective 
bargaining to secular issues such as wages and benefit plans, neutral criteria are used 
to insure that religion is neither advanced nor inhibited. . . . In the present case, the 
State would require only that the Diocese recognize the lay teachers’ right to bargain 
collectively over wages, benefits, and any other terms and conditions required by the 
agreement with the lay high-school teachers. The State would not force the Diocese to 
negotiate terms that would affect religious matters.”). 
 22 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 168 (2012). 
 23 See Rerum Novarum, supra note 1; Laborum Exercens, supra note 8; U.S. 
Catholic Bishops, Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship, (2007). It is possible 
that an improvement in labor protections at Catholic schools may also lead to an 
improvement in education at those schools. This change may in turn help to address 
declining enrollments at Catholic high schools and elementary schools. See generally 
DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION MOVEMENT AND 
THE DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2013); Adam Clark, By the numbers: N.J. 
Catholic school education, NJ ADVANCE MEDIA FOR NJ.COM (Sep. 21, 2015), 
http://www.nj.com/education//2015/09/the_decline_in_catholic_education_by_the_nu.ht
ml (“Since its peak in the 1960s, Catholic school education has experienced a decline in 
enrollment over the past half century in New Jersey and throughout America. As the 
number of students has dropped—there are fewer than half as many students enrolled 
in Catholic school in New Jersey now (82,978) as there were in 1980 (190,800)—schools 
across the state have been shuttered.”). 
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church-operated schools in the NLRA.24 As a result, the Court 
concluded, the Board had no jurisdiction in a labor dispute 
between the teachers who were attempting to organize and the 
two dioceses.25 The Court based its decision on the prudential 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance.26 By finding the NLRB 
lacked jurisdiction, the Court dodged a construction of the 
NLRA that would require it to address difficult issues about 
the relationship between labor and the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment.27  
This decision prevented two groups of lay teachers 
(approximately 226 people) from receiving NLRB certification 
of their representation by two local unions.28 Teachers in the 
Quigley North and the Quigley South minor seminary schools 
operated by the Catholic Bishop of Chicago had joined the 
Quigley Educational Alliance, an affiliate of the Illinois 
Education Association.29 Teachers in five high schools operated 
by the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc. had selected the 
Community Alliance for Teachers of Catholic High Schools to 
represent them.30  
 
 24 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979). The 5–4 
majority opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Burger and joined by Justices Stewart, 
Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. But see id. at 516 (“In construing the Board’s 
jurisdiction to exclude church-operated schools, therefore, the Court today is faithful to 
neither the statute’s language nor its history. Moreover, it is also untrue to its own 
precedents.”) (Brennan, J. dissenting); cf. KENNETH G. DAU, ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE 
CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE 167 (2009) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)) (suggesting that 
the NLRB could decline to exercise jurisdiction over the employment of teachers in 
religious elementary and secondary schools under the discretionary power reserved in § 
14(c)(1) of the NLRA because labor disputes involving such schools have an effect on 
commerce that is “not sufficiently substantial.”). 
 25 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 506 (“The absence of an ‘affirmative intention of 
the Congress clearly expressed’ fortifies our conclusion that Congress did not 
contemplate that the Board would require church-operated schools to grant recognition 
to unions as bargaining agents for their teachers.”). 
 26 Id. at 500 (stating that “an Act of Congress ought not be construed to violate 
the Constitution if any other possible construction remains available”) (internal 
citations omitted). For historical background on the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 76–80 (6th ed. 2009). For criticism of the doctrine, 
see Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 74 (arguing that 
“in interpreting statutes so as to avoid ‘unnecessary’ constitutional decisions, the Court 
frequently interprets a statute in ways that its drafters did not anticipate, and . . . may 
not have preferred . . . . [This practice] involves paying a price for the benefits thought 
to come from judicial reticence”). 
 27 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 507. 
 28 Id. at 494. 
 29 Id. at 492, 494. 
 30 Id. at 494. Professor Susan Stabile argues that the Court’s decision applies 
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Despite prevailing in elections supervised by the NLRB, 
both unions were denied recognition by management.31 
Additionally, the management of the church-operated schools 
refused to bargain with the unions.32 These actions contravened 
the rights of the teachers to form labor unions and to bargain 
collectively with their employers under section 8(a)(1) and (5) of 
the NLRA, respectively.33 Consequently, the unions filed unfair 
labor practice complaints with the Board pursuant to those 
provisions.34  
Justice Brennan’s withering dissent (in which he was joined 
by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun) called for NLRB 
jurisdiction.35 According to Justice Brennan, the Court’s 
decision ignored the NLRA’s language, its legislative history, 
and the Court’s own precedents.36 Moreover, the Court’s newly 
minted requirement of affirmative expression on the part of 
Congress would allow “wholesale judicial dismemberment of 
congressional enactments.”37  
Regarding the Act’s language, Justice Brennan noted that 
the NLRA listed specific exclusions that did not include 
religious institutions.38 On the issue of the NLRA’s legislative 
history, Congress’s rejection of exemptions similar to those 
 
only to parochial grade and high schools and therefore does not bar NLRB jurisdiction 
over colleges and universities in every situation. Susan Stabile, Blame It on Catholic 
Bishop: The Question of NLRB Jurisdiction Over Religious Colleges and Universities, 
39 Pepp. L. Rev. 1317, 1329 (2013) (“Although Catholic Bishop uses the phrase 
“church-operated” school rather than parochial school, the language the court uses to 
talk about the risk of entanglement is descriptive of parochial schools but not typical of 
colleges and universities that are not seminary schools. The ‘entire focus of Catholic 
Bishop was upon the obligation of lay faculty to imbue and indoctrinate the student 
body with the tenets of religious faith,’ which is not present at the university level.”); 
id. at 1330 (quoting NLRB v. Bishop Ford Cent. Catholic High Sch., 623 F.2d 818, 822 
(2d Cir. 1980)). However, Prof. Stabile admits that then-Judge Breyer in Bayamon, as 
well as the D.C. Circuit in Great Falls, read Catholic Bishop as applying to both 
parochial schools and colleges and universities. Id. at 1329. 
 31 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 494. 
 32 Id. 
 33 National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (2012). 
 34 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 494. 
 35 Id. at 508 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
 36 Id. at 511 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
 37 Id. (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
 38 Id. (Brennan, J. dissenting). Section 2(2) of the Act excludes from its 
definition of employer (1) the United States, (2) any wholly owned Government 
corporation, (3) any Federal Reserve Bank, (4) any State, (5) political subdivisions of a 
State, (6) any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, (7) any labor organization, and 
(8) anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization. National 
Labor Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012). 
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created by the Court was cited by Justice Brennan to 
demonstrate legislative intent contrary to the Court’s holding.39 
Finally, the Court failed to distinguish its numerous prior 
decisions affirming the Board’s jurisdictional coverage of any 
employer within Congress’s reach under the Commerce 
Clause.40  
Since the Court did not reach the constitutional issues, 
neither did Justice Brennan.41 But the audacity of the 
majority’s decision was clear: in the face of contrary language, 
legislative intent, and precedent, the Court denied teachers 
their chosen representatives by creating an exemption cut from 
whole cloth.  
1. The NLRB’s response to Catholic Bishop 
Over the next twenty years, the NLRB responded to this 
ruling by developing a jurisprudence around determining the 
religiosity of an institution case by case.42 Based on the 
outcome of this inquiry, the Board would then decide if 
exercising its jurisdiction would pose a considerable risk of 
violating that employer’s First Amendment rights.43 The 
substantial religious character test, as it became known, looked 
beyond an employer’s mere association with a religious 
organization.44 The Board assessed the employer’s purpose, the 
involvement of the employees in achieving that purpose, and 
 
 39 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 512–15. (Brennan, J. dissenting) (“The Hartley 
bill, which passed the House of representatives in 1947, would have provided the 
exception the Court today writes into the statute. . . . But the proposed exception was 
not enacted. . . . Instead, the Senate proposed an exception limited to nonprofit 
hospitals, and passed the bill in that form. The Senate version was accepted by the 
House in conference, thus limiting the exception for nonprofit employers to nonprofit 
hospitals. Even that limited exemption was ultimately repealed in 1974. In doing so, 
Congress confirmed the view of the Act expressed here: that it was intended to cover all 
employers—including nonprofit employers—unless expressly excluded, and that the 
1947 amendment excluded only nonprofit hospitals.”) (internal citations and footnotes 
omitted). 
 40 Id. at 516–17 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (citing Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 
U.S. 1, 3 (1957); Polish Nat’l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 647–48 (1944); NLRB v. 
Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939); NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 
226 (1963)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 41 Id. at 518. 
 42 Univ. of Great Falls, 331 NLRB 1663, 1664 (2000); see also Livingstone 
College, 286 NLRB 1301, 1309–10 (1987); Jewish Day School, 283 NLRB 757, 760–61 
(1983); Trustee of St. Joseph’s Coll., 282 NLRB 65, 68 (1986). 
 43 Univ. of Great Falls, 331 NLRB 1663, 1664 (2000). 
 44 Id. 
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the likely effects should the Board find jurisdiction.45  
Phrased in this manner, the substantial religious character 
test does not seem facially problematic as it pertains to the 
First Amendment. However, the factors the Board considered 
in its evaluation of religiously affiliated employers reveals its 
ultimately fatal shortcomings. As part of its substantial 
religious character analysis, the NLRB asked whether the 
school used religious requirements as part of its hiring and 
evaluation of faculty, to what extent the school had a religious 
curriculum and mission, and how involved the religious group 
was in the daily operation of the school.46  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given its weighing of the 
religiousness of a school’s activities and purpose, the 
substantial religious character test and the NLRB’s forays into 
jurisdiction over church-operated institutions by means of it 
were eventually rejected. In Great Falls, the D.C. Circuit Court 
characterized this test as the kind of trolling and intrusive 
examination that Catholic Bishop and the Religion Clauses 
expressly prohibited.47  
2. The Great Falls test  
In 2002, the D.C. Circuit expressly rejected the Board’s 
substantial religious character test for jurisdiction in Great 
Falls. The court adopted a new test based on then-Judge 
Breyer’s plurality opinion for the evenly divided First Circuit in 
Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB (“the Great Falls 
test”).48 This test asks only whether the school (1) holds itself 
out as a religious school, (2) is nonprofit, and (3) is religiously 
affiliated.49  
Teachers at the University of Great Falls (“the university” 
or “the school”) organized with the Montana Federation of 
Teachers, only to be denied recognition by the university.50 
After successfully petitioning the Board for recognition, the 
 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 1664–65. 
 47 University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(“Here too we have the NLRB trolling through the beliefs of the University, making 
determinations about its religious mission, and that mission’s centrality to the ‘primary 
purpose’ of the University.”). 
 48 Id. at 1343. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 1337. 
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teachers asked the university to bargain collectively and were 
again denied.51 The Board’s Acting General Counsel then 
issued an unfair labor practice claim against the university, 
and the case was subsequently brought before the Board.52  
The Board ruled in favor of the teachers, finding it proper to 
exercise jurisdiction under Catholic Bishop and the substantial 
religious character test. The Board held that the teachers 
continued to be represented by the Montana Federation of 
Teachers under section 9(a) of the NLRA and the teachers’ 
bargaining rights under section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the NLRA 
had been violated by the university.53  
But the teachers’ success with the Board was rebuffed by 
the D.C. Circuit. The circuit court characterized the Board’s 
proceedings as “trolling through the beliefs of the University” 
in the very manner the Supreme Court proscribed in Catholic 
Bishop.54 Citing Employment Division v. Smith for the 
proposition that the Free Exercise Clause forbids judges from 
appraising the centrality of religious beliefs, the D.C. Circuit 
called the Board’s behavior nothing less than a “dissection of 
life and beliefs at the University.”55 The court attributed this 
 
 51 Id. at 1338. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 1339. The university’s challenge to the Board’s ruling also involved a 
claim that the Board’s order to bargain collectively with the teachers would violate the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). Id. at 1338. Since the D.C. Circuit Court 
denied the teachers recognition based on Catholic Bishop, it did not reach the 
university’s RFRA objection. Id. at 1347. However, the Court did mention that the two 
questions are separate, and that schools not exempt under Catholic Bishop are not 
therefore barred from making a successful argument under RFRA. Id. Whether courts 
would permit the Board to protect employees’ rights under the NLRA against a RFRA 
challenge falls outside the scope of this Article. 
 54 Id. at 1342. 
 55 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990); Great Falls, 278 F.3d 
at 1342–43. In its application of its view of Smith to administrative proceedings, the 
D.C. Circuit suggested that if judges must not determine the centrality of religious 
beliefs, that prohibition must apply to Regional Directors and the full Board, a fortiori: 
“It cannot be any more appropriate for a Regional Director or the full Board to engage 
in such a determination.” Id. Notably absent from the court’s opinion was any mention 
of Smith’s more commonly cited holding, i.e., that the Free Exercise Clause does not 
exempt people from valid and neutral laws of general applicability. Smith, 494 U.S. at 
879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in the judgment)). At the federal level, Congress replaced Smith’s standard with strict 
scrutiny by means of RFRA, though this enactment has been neither wholly successful 
nor without critics. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (finding 
RFRA unconstitutional as applied to states because it exceeds Congress’s power under 
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Angela C. Carmella & Eugene Gressman, The 
RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 Ohio State L. J. 65, 117 (1996) (“RFRA 
sets a dangerous prototype for future congressional fits of displeasure with Supreme 
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impermissible inquiry on the part of the Board to the 
substantial religious character test.56 Adopting the criteria 
from Bayamon, the court found that the university satisfied all 
three parts easily.57 As a result, the court refused to recognize 
the teachers seeking to organize and allowed the university to 
avoid collective bargaining.58  
3. The shortcomings of the Great Falls test  
The Great Falls test, which remains the D.C. Circuit’s 
preference, is no test at all.59 It fails to establish any 
meaningful check on institutions wishing to escape the reach of 
the NLRA by means of the Catholic Bishop exemption. Rather, 
it offers three simple prescriptions for schools to frustrate 
organizing among their faculty. The lack of adequate reasons 
for choosing these requirements and the ease with which each 
prong is met expose the D.C. Circuit’s willingness to frustrate 
teachers’ attempts to organize.  
The D.C. Circuit provided scant substantiation for the 
usefulness of the Great Falls test. The first part of the test, 
that an institution holds itself out as religious, deserves 
particular attention here. The court provided a curious 
rationale for this prong, and it survives in the Pacific Lutheran 
test (where the Board adopted not only the prong but also one 
of the D.C. Circuit’s reasons for supporting it).60  
 
Court rulings by giving impetus to future enactments of RFRA-type super-statutes.”). 
 56 Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1347. 
 57 Id. at 1345. 
 58 Id. at 1348. 
 59 Whether the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Great Falls is binding on the Board, 
even in that circuit, is unclear. Intracircuit nonacquiescence, as it is called, occurs 
when an agency refuses “to follow a circuit court’s precedents even when acting subject 
to that circuit’s, and no other circuit’s, power of judicial review.” Dan T. Coenen, The 
Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1341 
(1991). Prof. Stabile states that Great Falls is not binding on the Board outside of the 
D.C. Circuit, implying that Great Falls is binding within the circuit. Stabile, supra note 
30, at n.67. Oddly, Prof. Stabile then cites to a case where the Board holds that it alone 
decides whether to adhere to the rulings of circuit courts and that proceedings below 
must only consider the Board’s precedents when issuing orders. Id. See Ins. Agents’ 
Int’l Union, 119 NLRB 768, 773 (1957). This policy means that even in the D.C. Circuit, 
the Board may deviate from that court’s precedents “until the Supreme Court of the 
United States has ruled otherwise.” Id. 
 60 Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB 157, 162–63 (2014) (“This threshold 
requirement will, however, allow the Board to dismiss claims from universities that 
assert they are religious organizations solely in an attempt to avoid the Board’s 
jurisdiction.”). The Board also imports the D.C. Circuit’s market-check reasoning to the 
employment context to support the second component of its Pacific Lutheran test, i.e., 
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The court explained the need for the first part of the test by 
saying “it will help to ensure that the [Catholic Bishop] 
exemption is not given to wholly secular institutions that 
attempt to invoke it solely to avoid Board jurisdiction.”61 
Imposing this requirement for this reason suggests two 
difficult-to-support implications: (1) completely secular schools 
exist that, in response to their employees’ attempt to organize, 
claim that they in fact provide a religious educational 
environment, even though they have never stated this position 
before, to foil their employees’ plans, and (2) courts are unable 
to identify that chicanery without an explicit command to do 
so. 
Regarding the first possibility, the court gave no examples 
at all of institutions that have attempted this particular course 
of action.62 Similarly, the court offers no support for the need to 
tell courts to be wary of such behavior. So, what work is this 
prong actually doing?  
The D.C. Circuit revealed that the effect of this requirement 
 
that a university must hold out faculty wishing to unionize as performing religious 
functions to further the school’s religious mission. Id. at 165. Regarding the D.C. 
Circuit’s support for the other two prongs of the Great Falls test, the court offered very 
little. The D.C. Circuit justified the nonprofit requirement by noting the simplicity of 
evaluating it: “[I]t is hard to draw a line between the secular and religious activities of 
a religious organization. However, it is relatively straightforward to distinguish 
between a non-profit and a for-profit entity.” Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1344 (internal 
citations omitted). For the third part of the test, that the school must be religiously 
affiliated, the court mustered only one sentence: “Finally, as we observed above, the 
third element, at least in its simplest form, is directly analogous to Catholic Bishop.” 
Id. at 1344–45. 
 61 Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1344. 
 62 For information regarding the tactics schools and businesses in fact use to 
prevent teachers and other employees from organizing, see e.g., ALLIANCE EDUCATORS 
UNITED, Alliance Refuses to Settle; Educators File New Charges, (Aug. 24, 2015), 
http://www.allianceeducators.com/alliance-refuses-to-settle-violations-educators-file-
new-charges/ (“Management has attempted to block the teachers’ drive to organize a 
union by threatening individual teachers with poor evaluations if they engage in union 
activity. In addition, teacher emails have been blocked; principals told teachers that 
they couldn’t hand out union information fliers on their off-time; and union members 
and organizers have been denied their right to have access to speak with other 
educators during break time on school property.”); Kate Bronfenbrenner, Briefing 
Paper, No Holds Barred: The Intensification of Employer Opposition to Organizing, 
ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE (May 20, 2009), 
http://epi.3cdn.net/edc3b3dc172dd1094f_0ym6ii96d.pdf (“[E]mployers use supervisor 
one-on-ones to threaten workers for union activity in 54% of campaigns and to 
interrogate workers about their union activities and that of coworkers in at least 63% 
of campaigns. In addition to interrogation, 14% of employers use surveillance, 
primarily electronic (11%), and 28% of employers attempt to infiltrate the organizing 
committee in order to learn more about union supporters and activity.”). 
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is not to prevent charlatans from gaining the exemption. 
Instead, the first prong blocks any policing of the exemption, 
thus clearing the way for more schools to exploit it. If schools 
publicly display their religiousness, the court said, they are 
inoculated against judicial scrutiny because “[w]here a school, 
college, or university holds itself out publicly as a religious 
institution, ‘we cannot doubt that [it] sincerely holds this 
view.’”63 Here, the court makes clear, the public display of 
religiousness ipso facto forbids further review. The D.C. Circuit 
shuns any sort of analysis regarding a significant immunity 
from federal law in favor of a policy that boils down to “if you 
say it, you get it.” 
The D.C. Circuit’s own relaxed inquiry into the university’s 
satisfaction of this prong demonstrates the ease with which 
any institution can pass it. The court refers specifically to the 
university’s course catalogue, mission statement, and student 
bulletin.64 These representations were enough to convince the 
court that the university fulfilled the first requirement.65 While 
considering those documents does avoid entanglement with 
religious issues, it also fails to support the court’s stated goal of 
“provid[ing] reasonable assurance that the Catholic Bishop 
exemption will not be abused.”66  
The superficiality of the court’s analysis is evident. Any 
novice web-designer would be able to create a website that 
included those dispositive materials. This is not to say that 
institutions engage in such deceptive behavior to gain the 
exemption (as the court implies they do). The point is that the 
court’s stated need for the public display of religiousness—
protecting the exemption from abuse—is not in any way 
addressed by the first prong. As the University of Great Falls’s 
own website shows, nothing more is needed to meet this aspect 
of the Great Falls test.67 The simplicity of passing the first 
 
 63 Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1344 (quoting Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 
U.S. 640, 653 (2000)). 
 64 Id. at 1345 (mentioning “other documents” as well). In support of its finding 
that the university holds itself out as a religious institution, the court also says that 
the university’s campus, classrooms, and offices contain Catholic icons. Since the claim 
that the school’s classroom and office placements of Catholic icons constitutes a public 
display is difficult to square with the meaning of the word “public,” it is unclear why 
this comment appears in the court’s reasoning. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See UNIVERSITY OF GREAT FALLS, Mission, 
http://www.ugf.edu/AboutUGF/Mission/tabid/83/Default.aspx; UNIVERSITY OF GREAT 
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third of the test belies the court’s purported goal. The 
requirement is not there to keep schools out, it is there to let 
schools in. 
The second reason the D.C. Circuit offers to justify the 
holding out requirement is that it functions as a market 
check.68 Schools that display their religious affiliation openly 
will suffer, the court claims, as a result of that representation.69 
As the court sees it, though the religious affiliation of the 
school will entice some prospective students and faculty, it will 
also deter others.70 The court stops short of saying that the 
open religiousness of an institution discourages more people 
than it attracts, preferring the ambiguous characterization, “it 
comes at a cost.”71 This kind of response is desirable, the D.C. 
Circuit avers, because it too will aid in stanching the flood of 
schools representing themselves as religious merely to gain the 
Catholic Bishop exemption.72  
Again, the D.C. Circuit declines to cite any authority to 
support these contentions. This failure may be the result of 
how notoriously difficult it is to explain consumer behavior.73 
Consumers buy things for a host of reasons, and those reasons 
differ widely from person to person.74 While religious affiliation 
 
FALLS, Undergraduate Catalogue, http://www.ugf.edu/Academics/Undergraduate/ 
UndergraduateCatalog/tabid/237/Default.aspx; University of Great Falls, Facebook 
Page, https://www.facebook. com/ugfargos. 
 68 Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1344. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See e.g., Stuart Elliott, A Quest to Learn What Drives Consumer Decisions, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 29, 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/business/media/30adco.html (“‘Understanding the 
foundation of consumers’ behavior decisions has become more complex,’ [Michael 
Fassnacht, global chief strategic officer at Draftcb] added, as they ‘consume more 
information and make decisions faster’ than before. And the internet enables 
consumers to be ‘in shopping and decision mode at the same time, 24/7,’ Mr. Fassnacht 
said, which further complicates efforts to decipher their decision-making.”); Robert H. 
Frank, The Impact of the Irrelevant on Decision-Making, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/business/30view.html (“[E]ven patently false or 
irrelevant information often affects choices in significant ways.”). 
 74 See, e.g., Todd Zywicki, “Consumer Credit and the American Economy,” Part 3: 
Behavioral economic analysis of consumer credit use, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 
14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/10/15/consumer-credit-and-the-american-economy-part-3-
behavioral-economics-analysis-of-consumer-credit-use/ (“[B]ehavioral economists . . . 
note that consumers often simplify, taking shortcuts and using ‘rules of thumb.’ 
Consumers are often satisfied to take small steps to goals . . . rather than making the 
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is often important to some consumers, its predictive accuracy is 
unreliable.75  
The analysis of consumer behavior is even more muddled 
when it comes to higher education. Popular ratings services 
such as U.S. News and World Report strongly influence this 
market.76 Worse for the D.C. Circuit’s rationale for requiring 
open religiousness from schools is that Catholic colleges and 
universities in particular have seen their enrollment grow over 
the past decade.77 This trend has occurred in the face of data 
showing that fewer and fewer people identify themselves as 
practicing Catholics.78 So while it might be true that the 
religious affiliation of a school, in some difficult-to-articulate 
way, matters to the market, the idea that this holding out 
comes at a cost is probably inaccurate.79  
The problems of the Great Falls test, from its inefficacy 
regarding its stated goal, to the court’s ill-conceived rationale 
 
effort to achieve the optimum. Culture, group membership, attitudes, past experience, 
and even biases may influence the decision process.”); Understanding Why People Buy, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Aug. 8, 2005), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2005-08-
08/understanding-why-people-buy; Alain Samson, Seven Reasons Why We’re Irrational 
Shoppers, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/ 
blog/consumed/201309/seven-reasons-why-were-irrational-shoppers (identifying 
marketing, imitation, impulsiveness, hedonism, “hot states,” states of mind such as 
distraction, and habit as influencing consumer behavior). 
 75 Jessica M. Bailey and James Sood, The Effects of Religious Affiliation on 
Consumer Behavior: A Preliminary Investigation, 5 J. OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES 328 
(1993). 
 76 See Eleanor Barkhorn, College Rankings Really Do Influence Which Schools 
Students Apply To, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/01/college-rankings-really-do-
influence-which-schools-students-apply-to/283151/ (“Being on U.S. News’s top 25 list 
led a school’s applications to go up between six and 10 percent.”). But see Bob Morse, 
Freshman Students Say Rankings Aren’t Key Factor in College Choice, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT (Jan. 31, 2013, 10:30 AM), 
http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/college-rankings-blog/2013/01/31/freshmen-
students-say-rankings-arent-key-factor-in-college-choice (stating that college rankings 
placed twelfth out of twenty-three possible reasons students could choose as very 
important factors in deciding which school they attended). 
 77 ASSOCIATION OF CATHOLIC COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, FAQs, 
http://www.accunet.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3797#sthash.Lqc76FSO.dpbs 
(noting that in the 2012–2013 academic year, Catholic post-secondary schools educated 
939,907 students, whereas in the 2000–2001 academic year, that number was 577,961). 
 78 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, America’s Changing Religious Landscape, (May 12, 
2015), http://www.pewforum.org/ 2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/ 
(“Catholics appear to be declining both as a percentage of the population and in 
absolute numbers.”). 
 79 Richard Perez-Pena, Muslims From Abroad Are Thriving in Catholic Colleges, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/03/education/muslims-
enroll-at-catholic-colleges-in-growing-numbers.html?_r=0. 
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behind it, demonstrate the need for something better. With the 
Pacific Lutheran test, the Board attempted to fashion a 
compromise that would satisfy the D.C. Circuit’s First 
Amendment concerns while still allowing the Board to carry 
out its mandate under the NLRA.  
4. The Pacific Lutheran test 
In 2014, the NLRB asserted jurisdiction over adjunct 
professors attempting to organize at Pacific Lutheran 
University (“PLU”) in Tacoma, Washington.80 The Board 
declined to use the Great Falls test as the D.C. Circuit had 
formulated it.81 Instead, the Board combined an element of the 
Great Falls test with something similar to the ministerial 
exception to create a new test.  
The Pacific Lutheran test mandates that for an institution 
to escape the NLRA by way of Catholic Bishop, it must (1) hold 
itself out as providing a religious educational environment, and 
(2) hold the petitioned-for faculty out as performing a religious 
function in furtherance of the institution’s religious mission.82 
The Board stated the new test is sensitive to its statutory duty 
to assert the broadest jurisdiction permissible under the 
Commerce Clause while also being faithful to Catholic 
Bishop.83  
The Board characterized the first part of its test as a 
threshold question.84 Evidence that would make the 
appropriate showing includes corporate documents, course 
catalogues, handbooks, mission statements, and publications 
on a school’s website.85 To satisfy the demand of the second 
 
 80 Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB 157, 168 (2014). 
 81 Id. at 162. The Board framed its discussion of the inadequacy of the Great 
Falls test in such a way that suggests both the frailty of its components and the 
solution the Board offers in its new test: 
Although this approach may avoid constitutionally problematic inquiries, it 
overreaches because it focuses solely on the nature of the institution, without 
considering whether the petitioned-for faculty members act in support of the 
school’s religious mission. The Great Falls test could deny the protections of the 
Act to faculty members who teach in completely nonreligious educational 
environments if the college or university is able to point to any statement 
suggesting the school’s—but not the faculty’s—connection to religion, no matter 
how tenuous that connection may be. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 82 Id. at 157. 
 83 Id. at 161. 
 84 Id. at 157. 
 85 Id. at 162. 
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step, that faculty be held out by the school as executing a 
specific religious function, broad statements that all faculty 
must support the mission of the university will be 
insufficient.86 An institution will need to provide evidence such 
as employment contracts, faculty handbooks, and statements 
made to accrediting bodies, prospective faculty, and students.87  
For its inquiry into the threshold question, the Board 
reviewed the relevant materials from PLU and found that its 
public representations about its religiousness mostly espoused 
the school’s acceptance of other faiths, its commitment to 
academic freedom, and an explicit de-emphasis of specific 
Lutheran dogma.88 Nonetheless, the Board concluded that PLU 
holds itself out as providing a religious educational 
environment.89 On the question of PLU’s representations 
regarding its faculty, the Board’s assessment was that “there is 
nothing . . . that would suggest to faculty (either existing or 
prospective), students, or the community that [PLU’s] 
contingent faculty members perform any religious function.”90  
The Board’s decision in Pacific Lutheran elicited two 
dissents aimed directly at the new test.91 All three opinions laid 
claim to the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Hosanna-Tabor 
recognizing for the first time a ministerial exception grounded 
 
 86 Id. at 164 (“These types of representations do not communicate the message 
that the religious nature of the university affects faculty members’ job duties or 
requirements. They give no indication that faculty members are expected to 
incorporate religion into their teaching or research, that faculty members will have any 
religious requirements imposed on them, or that the religious nature of the university 
will have any impact at all on their employment.”). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 168; id. at 167 (“The faculty handbook states, ‘The university values as 
its highest priority excellence in teaching.’ It describes PLU as ‘[s]teeped in the 
Lutheran commitment to freedom of thought.’); id. at 168 (“A specific reference to 
Lutheranism on PLU’s website, appearing in a “Frequently Asked Questions” section 
for prospective students, downplays the religious character of the school: 
Q: Do you have to be a Lutheran to attend PLU? 
A: Not at all. Students of all faiths—or of no faith—attend PLU. 
. . . 
Q: Do I have to attend chapel? 
A: No. . . . PLU was founded by Scandinavian immigrants, so Lutheran heritage is very 
important to our school, but that doesn’t mean it will be forced on you. . . . There are 
many religious opportunities that are offered on and off-campus for people of all 
faiths.”). 
 89 Id. at 167. 
 90 Id. at 170. 
 91 Id. at 182 (Miscimarra, Member, concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
id. at 183 (Johnson, Member, dissenting). 
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in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.92 The 
similarity between the Pacific Lutheran test and the 
ministerial exception described by the Supreme Court in 
Hosanna-Tabor raises the question: would the Board’s new test 
secure the High Court’s approval?  
5. Pacific Lutheran and Hosanna-Tabor  
The Hosanna-Tabor decision arose from a suit filed by a 
teacher, Cheryl Perich, under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”) against the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
School.93 Perich alleged that she had been fired in retaliation 
for asserting her rights under the ADA.94 She had been 
diagnosed with narcolepsy at the end of the 2003–2004 school 
year, and began the next school year on disability leave.95 After 
the administration replaced Perich without notice, asked her to 
resign, and barred her from the school, Perich explained to the 
school that she intended to seek legal recourse.96 Hosanna-
Tabor then formally terminated Perich.97 In response to her 
suit, the school claimed that Perich had been fired for violating 
the church’s belief that Christians must settle disputes 
internally.98  
In a unanimous decision, the Court dismissed Perich’s 
claim.99 Finding that Perich was a minister within the meaning 
of the exception, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the First 
Amendment required this outcome.100 If Perich were given the 
relief she requested, the Court said, it would penalize the 
church for firing her.101 The ministerial exception forbids such a 
 
 92 Id. at 166–67; Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
E.E.O.C., 565 U.S.171 (2012). 
 93 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 at 179. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 178. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 180. 
 99 Id. at 194. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. In the part of the opinion that explicitly denied Perich the relief she 
sought, Chief Justice Roberts seized the moment to deny Perich relief she did not seek: 
“Perich originally sought an order reinstating Perich to her former position as a called 
teacher. By requiring the Church to accept a minister it did not want, such an order 
would have plainly violated the Church’s freedom under the Religion Clauses to select 
its own ministers.” Id. 
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ruling.102 “The church,” the Court stated, “must be free to 
choose who will guide it on its way.”103 
To evaluate whether Perich was indeed a minister, the 
Court rejected a strict formula, preferring instead to consider 
the totality of the circumstances of her employment.104 This 
choice yielded a thorough discussion of Perich’s credentials and 
job duties.105 The Court also looked to both Perich’s and the 
school’s representations as to whether she was a minister.106 In 
rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s outcome below, the Court even 
acknowledged that the facts to which the Sixth Circuit gave 
weight—lay teachers performing the same tasks as Perich and 
the amount of time Perich spent performing religious work—
were nonetheless relevant.107  
On its face, the Court’s embrace of this searching inquiry in 
the context of the ministerial exception certainly suggests that 
it would approve the Pacific Lutheran test’s second prong. But 
the Court repeatedly refused to make any one factor 
determinative.108 Whereas Chief Justice Roberts emphasized 
the importance of multiple considerations throughout the 
opinion, the Pacific Lutheran test makes the fatal mistake of 
giving dispositive weight to only one (i.e., the holding out of 
faculty as performing a religious function in maintaining its 
religious educational environment).  
The Court did begin its analysis of Perich’s role by stating 
that Hosanna-Tabor held her out as a minister, and later went 
 
 102 Id. (internal footnote omitted). 
 103 Id. at 196. 
 104 Id. at 191. 
 105 Id. at 191–93. 
 106 Id. at 193. 
 107 Id. at 192–94. 
 108 See id. at 192 (“In light of these considerations—the formal title given Perich 
by the Church, the substance reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the 
important religious functions she performed for the Church—we conclude that Perich 
was a minister covered by the ministerial exception.”); id. (“Although such a title, by 
itself, does not automatically ensure coverage, the fact that an employee has been 
ordained or commissioned as a minister is surely relevant, as is the fact that 
significant religious training and a recognized religious mission underlie the 
description of the employee’s position.”); id. (“But though relevant, it cannot be 
dispositive that others not formally recognized as ministers by the church perform the 
same functions—particularly when, as here, they did so only because commissioned 
ministers were unavailable.”); id. at 194 (“The amount of time an employee spends on 
particular activities is relevant in assessing that employee’s status, but that factor 
cannot be considered in isolation, without regard to the nature of the religious 
functions performed and the other considerations discussed above.”). 
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so far as to admonish the Sixth Circuit for saying “that an 
employee’s title does not matter.”109 And to find that Perich was 
a minister, the Court reviewed evidence that would likely 
receive similar attention from the Board under Pacific 
Lutheran. Were they enough for the Court, these aspects of the 
Court’s decision would have made the Pacific Lutheran test’s 
viability more certain.  
However, the Court went well beyond Hosanna-Tabor’s 
holding out of Perich as a minister. Among other things, the 
Court detailed the educational requirements of her title, her 
weekly job duties, the congregation’s role in her hiring and 
firing, and her own tax filings.110 The multifaceted approach of 
the Court contrasts sharply with the Pacific Lutheran test’s 
single, decisive question regarding ministry. This conflict 
strongly suggests that the Pacific Lutheran test would not 
survive in the Supreme Court. 
For these reasons, the Pacific Lutheran test seems likely to 
go the way of the substantial religious character test. 
Fortunately, the New Jersey Supreme Court has created a 
solution to the problem of religious schools and unions.  
III. THE NEW JERSEY SOLUTION: ST. TERESA’S SECULAR 
CONTRACT TERMS AND NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES 
A. South Jersey Catholic School Teachers Organization 
v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church Elementary 
School 
The New Jersey Supreme Court vindicated Catholic school 
teachers’ collective bargaining rights in a case called South 
Jersey Catholic School Teachers Organization v. St. Teresa of 
the Infant Jesus Church Elementary School. The decision was 
handed down in 1997, and it involved teachers working in 
Catholic elementary schools that the Catholic Diocese of 
Camden operated.111 The court held that the teachers had a 
state constitutional right to unionize and to bargain collectively 
over secular contract terms such as wages and certain benefit 
 
 109 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 193. 
 110 Id. 
 111 South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus 
Church Elem. Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 712 (N.J. 1997). 
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plans.112 This right, the court found, did not offend the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment.113 Accordingly, the court 
ordered the Catholic Diocese of Camden to recognize and to 
bargain with the teachers’ union.114  
The teachers had elected the South Jersey Catholic School 
Teachers Organization to represent them in collective 
bargaining.115 The diocese’s Board of Pastors responded by 
requiring the union to sign a document that vested the Board 
of Pastors with “complete and final authority to dictate the 
outcome of any dispute.”116 Additionally, this document forbade 
the teachers’ union from collecting dues from the non-union 
members whose interests it represented.117 The union refused 
to sign, and the Board of Pastors in turn declined to recognize 
 
 112 Id. The New Jersey Constitution memorializes the right to organize as 
follows: “Persons in private employment shall have the right to organize and bargain 
collectively.” N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 19. In St. Teresa, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
treated Article I, Paragraph 19 as self-executing in the case of religious schools, i.e., the 
court enforced it in the absence of implementing legislation. Id. at 723 (quoting the 
Appellate Division’s opinion below, 675 A.2d 1155, 1171 (1996)); see also Robert F. 
Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 199–200 
(1983) (“The courts have developed a general test for determining whether a state 
constitutional provision is self-executing. The test focuses on whether the provision in 
question is capable of application or enforcement in the absence of implementing 
legislation. Presumably this refers to judicial application or enforcement.”). However, 
this is not to say that Article I, Paragraph 19 lacks such legislation. New Jersey’s 
Employer-Employee Relations Act, while not explicitly stating that it implements 
Article I, Paragraph 19, nonetheless does so. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-1 et seq. (2014). 
The Employer-Employee Relations Act’s declaration of policy demonstrates the 
connection: 
It is hereby declared as the public policy of this State that the best interests of the 
people of the State are served by the prevention or prompt settlement of labor 
disputes, both in the private and public sectors . . . and that the voluntary 
mediation of such public and private employer-employee disputes under the 
guidance and supervision of a governmental agency will tend to promote 
permanent, public and private employer-employee peace. . . . 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-2 (2014); see also THE NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF 
MEDIATION, Website, What We Do, (“The NJSBM was established by statute in 1941, 
the Employer-Employee Relations Act [sic]. . . . The Board’s primary mission is the 
prevention or prompt settlement of labor disputes involving private sector 
employees. . . .”). The Employer-Employee Relations Act does not apply in St. Teresa 
because it includes a specific exclusion for religious schools and their employees. N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.1(c) (2014). 
 113 St. Teresa, 696 A.2d at 712. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 713. The document was titled, “Minimum Standards for Organizations 
Wishing to Represent Lay Teachers in a Parish or Regional Catholic Elementary 
School in the Diocese of Camden.” 
 117 Id. 
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the union or to bargain collectively.118 The union then brought 
suit.119  
The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed both of the First 
Amendment’s Religion Clauses in the case.120 Regarding the 
Establishment Clause, the Board of Pastors argued that 
requiring the diocese to bargain with the union would hamper 
its “right to govern its educational process.”121 In this way, the 
Board of Pastors claimed, recognition and collective bargaining 
inhibited religion and therefore ran afoul of the second prong of 
the Lemon test.122  
The court disagreed. As the court saw it, the primary effect 
of the state constitutional provision did not involve religion at 
all.123 Rather, Article I, Paragraph 19 results in nothing more 
than collective bargaining between a private employer and its 
employees’ elected representative.124 Here, the court referred to 
the peaceful history of labor relations between the diocese and 
its high school teachers, with whom it had been bargaining 
collectively over secular terms for some 13 years.125 Since no 
inhibition occurred there, it followed that none was likely to 
occur in the case of the elementary teachers.126  
The court was similarly unpersuaded that excessive 
entanglement with religion, prohibited by the third prong of 
the Lemon test, would occur under this scheme. The court said 
that requiring collective bargaining over secular terms would 
involve only minimal, not excessive, contact between the state 
and the schools.127 The state would not impose religious beliefs, 
mandate the diocese negotiate terms affecting religious issues, 
 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 715 (“There are cases in which the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses should be analyzed jointly because ‘there has been some blurring of sharply 
honed differentiations’ between those clauses.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 121 Id. at 716. 
 122 Id. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (holding that for a 
statute to survive Establishment Clause scrutiny it must (1) have a secular legislative 
purpose, (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) 
not promote an excessive government entanglement with religion). Cf. Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (combining the first two prongs of the Lemon test 
into a question of whether the government endorsed or disapproved of religion in 
purpose or in fact) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 123 St. Teresa, 696 A.2d at 716. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 716–17. 
 126 Id. at 717. 
 127 Id. at 718. 
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or force the parties to agree to particular terms.128 The court’s 
vision for the state’s role in collective bargaining was for it to 
bring the private parties to the table, and then for it to leave 
them alone so that they might resolve their disagreements.129 
Regarding the Board of Pastors’ Free Exercise claim, the 
court applied Smith’s neutral law of general applicability 
standard, as well as the compelling state interest test.130 
Regarding the former, the court held that Article I, Paragraph 
19’s neutrality and general applicability are “beyond 
dispute.”131 The court said the intent of this provision is to 
better the economic well-being of private-sector workers.132 It 
regulates neither religious conduct nor belief.133 That Article I, 
Paragraph 19 inconveniences the free exercise of religion, the 
court went on, does not infringe the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment.134  
As to the compelling state interest test, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court flatly denied the Board of Pastors’ hybrid 
claims that prompted the court to apply it.135 These arguments 
against the teachers sought to attach the school’s freedom of 
association and parents’ right to control the upbringing of their 
children, respectively, to the school’s Free Exercise claim.136 
The court rejected the freedom of association claim because 
employers do not have a constitutional right to avoid 
associating if it endangers the right of employees’ to 
organize.137 On the issue of parents’ control over their children’s 
upbringing, the court stated the issue has no bearing on this 
case.138 
Despite these conclusions, the court also applied Smith’s 
compelling state interest test for hybrid claims.139 Quoting 
liberally from the appellate opinion below, the court found that 
New Jersey’s interest in allowing private employees to organize 
 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 721–23. 
 131 Id. at 721. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 721–22. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 722. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
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and to bargain collectively over secular contract terms was 
indeed compelling.140 Moreover, the court held, the application 
of neutral principles to labor disputes by civil courts assures 
the protection of the schools’ free exercise rights.141 The court 
ordered the Diocese of Camden to recognize the union and to 
bargain collectively with it.142 
B. The St. Teresa Test, Secular Contract Terms, 
Neutral Principles, and Catholic Bishop 
The St. Teresa test supports teachers’ right to bargain 
collectively where secular contract terms are at issue, and it 
instructs courts to apply neutral principles to disputes 
regarding those terms. This test should be adopted by the 
NLRB and embraced by federal courts. By focusing on these 
components of bargaining rather than on the bargainers 
themselves, the St. Teresa test and its enforcement 
demonstrate its ability to solve the problems of past cases.  
The St. Teresa court explained that the doctrine of neutral 
principles allows civil courts to decide secular legal questions 
even if they occur in a religious context.143 Neutral principles 
are entirely secular legal rules.144 The use of these rules in 
disputes involving religious parties does not involve judgments 
regarding ecclesiastical matters.145 As long as courts applying 
neutral principles are careful not to intrude on those issues, 
the court held, they are competent to resolve these cases.146  
Neutral principles of adjudication and secular contract 
terms allow the St. Teresa test to avoid the intrusion into and 
entanglement with religion that Catholic Bishop prohibited. In 
Catholic Bishop, the Supreme Court stated collective 
bargaining in church-operated schools made entanglement 
with religion inevitable.147 However, as the St. Teresa court 
held, the right to organize and to bargain over secular contract 
terms shows that this conclusion is erroneous.  
First, union elections, at least initially, do not even concern 
 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 722. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 723. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979). 
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the religious school. Just like any other private individuals, 
teachers at religious schools may associate and form 
organizations of various types on their own. If that 
organization is a labor union seeking recognition, the 
involvement between the school and the Board during the 
election process can be minimal or even non-existent.148 This 
part of organizing, then, neither entangles itself with religion, 
nor intrudes upon it. 
Second, religious schools bargain over contract terms with 
their employees all the time without offending the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment. When a religious school hires 
a particular teacher, no one would seriously dispute that the 
administrator and the teacher discuss all the topics that 
prospective employees and employers normally discuss: salary, 
benefits, hours, and duties. The St. Teresa test merely 
centralizes aspects of this negotiation through collective 
bargaining.  
Furthermore, this negotiating activity happens ad hoc 
between teachers and administrators after hiring as well. For 
example, if a principal announces at a faculty meeting that 
grades are due on a particular date, teachers (needing, as all 
teachers do, more time to grade) may engage with her on the 
requirement and succeed or fail in changing it. This interaction 
is bargaining over a secular contract term that did not occasion 
any constitutional issues. Indeed, it would be rather odd if the 
principal’s response to a request for an extra weekend to 
calculate grades invoked canon law.  
Since religious schools already engage with teachers over 
the kinds of subjects the St. Teresa test contemplates, they can 
certainly continue to do so when the teachers have come 
together as a union. Despite the Supreme Court’s assertions in 
Catholic Bishop, the engagement between teachers and 
administrators does not entail First Amendment infringement.  
 
 148 THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Conduct Elections, 
https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/conduct-elections. Initially, all the NLRB Regional 
Office requires of the employer is posting notices regarding the election. Id. Thereafter, 
the Regional Office and all the parties concerned create an agreement regarding the 
election. Id. And the employer may avoid even this modest level of interaction with the 
Board by voluntarily recognizing a union elected by other means. Id. 
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C. The St. Teresa Test, the Great Falls Test, and the 
Pacific Lutheran Test  
The St. Teresa test improves significantly on both the Great 
Falls test and the Pacific Lutheran test. The respective failures 
of those two tests, i.e., to implement federal labor policy and to 
meet the Supreme Court’s standards, are solved by the St. 
Teresa test.  
As discussed earlier, the Great Falls test amounts to an 
open door for religious institutions to exempt themselves from 
the NLRA.149 In this way, the Great Falls test frustrates the 
NLRA’s stated policy of “encouraging the practice and 
procedure of collective bargaining and [. . .] protecting the 
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own 
choosing.”150 By contrast, the St. Teresa test gives full weight to 
Congress’s expressed policy. It provides a framework for 
teachers who had previously been shut out from the Act’s 
protections by the Great Falls test to regain those rights.  
The advantage of the St. Teresa test over the Pacific 
Lutheran test is the doctrine of neutral principles. The idea 
that courts may use neutral principles to decide cases dealing 
with religious institutions has been explicitly approved by the 
Supreme Court.151 While the Pacific Lutheran test attempts a 
similar maneuver by using the ministerial exception to garner 
the Court’s favor, that attempt is likely to fail.152 Unlike that 
test, the St. Teresa test makes no such mistakes in its design. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s explanation of neutral 
principles stayed true to the Supreme Court’s own 
interpretation of the doctrine.  
IV. RERUM NOVARUM AND ST. TERESA: CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL DOCTRINE AND THE UNION 
The need to foster the NLRA’s commitment to encouraging 
organized labor and collective bargaining is certainly an 
 
 149 See supra Part II.A.1–3. 
 150 The National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
 151 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 597 (1979). For further discussion of neutral 
principles of law and courts’ application thereof, see LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, LAW AND 
RELIGION: CASES AND MATERIALS 210–21 (3d ed. 2013). 
 152 See supra Part II.A.4–5. 
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important reason to support the St. Teresa test. Yet, for 
Catholics, the church’s own social teaching provides an even 
greater reason: unions and collective bargaining have been the 
cornerstones of Catholic doctrine regarding economic issues 
since the nineteenth century. 
As the introduction states, Pope Leo XIII’s groundbreaking 
encyclical Rerum Novarum initiated this facet of Catholic 
doctrine. The pope’s message was clear. The then-current state 
of economic affairs was untenable. A very small number of 
people controlled the world’s wealth, power, and labor, while 
most people were left poor and suffering.153 One of the best 
answers to this problem, as the pope saw it, was labor 
unions.154 And the pope specifically stated, several times, that 
the state should intervene where necessary to promote the 
interests of the poor.155  
The St. Teresa test provides an appropriate vehicle by 
which to implement the Catholic social doctrine begun by Pope 
Leo XIII’s program.156 The St. Teresa test supports the 
formation of unions by preventing religious institutions from 
escaping the NLRA’s jurisdiction under the guise of the First 
Amendment. It welcomes the involvement of the state to 
resolve disputes between employers and employees, the 
necessity of which the pope himself anticipated.157 Not only 
does the test accomplish these goals, it also safeguards the 
religious beliefs of Catholic schools. For these reasons, Catholic 
schools can embrace the St. Teresa test and thereby live up to 
the expectations of Catholic social doctrine.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo XIII attributed the brutal 
conditions experienced by most working people to the appalling 
income inequality of his time. Income inequality continues to 
permeate the world today.158 Just as the problem the pope 
 
 153 Rerum Novarum supra note 1, at 1. 
 154 Id. at 49. 
 155 Id. at 16, 31, 32, 35, 45. 
 156 But see Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Mandatory Collective 
Bargaining Under Federal and State Labor Laws: Freedom From and Freedom For, 49 
VILL. L. REV. 77 (2004) (arguing that collective bargaining inevitably becomes 
embroiled in antagonism that is inconsistent with Catholic social teaching). 
 157 Rerum Novarum supra note 1, at 45. 
 158 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Inequality and the City, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2015), 
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recognized still exists, so does the solution he proposed: support 
for organized labor.  
The St. Teresa test offers a way for Catholic schools to 
embrace the pope’s long-echoed answer. In addition, it may 
resolve the decades of sparring between the Board and the 
federal courts over workers’ rights and the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment. 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/30/opinion/inequality-and-the-city.html; Barack 
Obama, Remarks by the President on Economic Mobility (Dec. 4, 2013, 11:31 AM), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/remarks-president-economic-
mobility. 
